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Does Oil Hinder Democratic Development?  
A Time-Series Analysis 
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Abstract: The resource curse is a topic studied intensively in both 
economics and political science. Much of the focus is now on 
whether oil affects democratic institutions. We further the debate 
through the use of additional measures of democracy and multiple 
time-series estimation strategies. We find no robust long-run effect 
of oil rents per capita on Polity, Civil Liberties, or Political Rights. 
Many comparable studies were restricted to Polity. We also use 
different country and period samples to respond to the findings that 
the effects of oil abundance may differ in Latin America, the Middle 
East, in mature oil producers, or that the effects become 
significantly negative post-1980. In each case we do not find a 
significant relationship. Long-run effects are well placed to address 
this question because they are estimated separately from short-run 
fluctuations (important given the slow pace of institutional change), 
and are consistent even in the presence of reverse causality.  
Keywords: resource curse, democracy, oil, natural resources, long-run 
relationships. 
JEL Classification: O13, P16, H11, P59, O11 
 
* O’Connor: Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089 
(E-mail kelseyoc@usc.edu); Blanco, Associate Professor, School of Public Policy, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA 
90263 (E-mail lblanco@pepperdine.edu); Nugent: Professor, Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 
Los Angeles, CA 90089 (E-mail nugent@usc.edu). We would like to thank Hashem Pesaran and Kamiar Mohaddes for 
comments, statistical theory and modeling support. 
I. Introduction 
The resource curse is a topic studied intensively in both economics and political science. The 
original discussion centered on why countries with large resource industries, typically measured 
by the share of natural resource exports in GDP, seemed to have slower rates of GDP growth 
than other countries. Many different reasons for this phenomenon have been offered. One 
prominent view traces the growth shortfalls experienced in natural resource-rich countries, to 
their weak political and other institutions. The question then becomes whether countries with 
substantial natural resources happen to have weak institutions or if natural resources retard the 
development of political institutions like democracy. Consequently, much of the resource curse 
literature has shifted to focus on the latter question.  
The purpose of this paper is to take a fresh look at the long-term effect of natural resources in 
the form of oil rents on political institutions. In particular we ask, do changing oil rents affect an 
overall measure of democratic development (Polity), or either of two important dimensions of 
democratic development, Civil Liberties and Political Rights? Most comparable studies have 
focused on Polity, yet there are reasons to expect differences across each measure. 
We find that oil rents do not have robust long-term effects on Polity, Civil Liberties, or 
Political Rights. This finding is supported by the results generated from multiple estimation 
strategies and holds also for different country groups. Our analysis differs from many others in 
that it focuses on the long-run effects of oil on democracy obtained from two time-series 
econometric models. Our primary model is an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, 
parameterized in error-correction form, which estimates the long-run effects separately from 
short-run fluctuations. Similar models have been used before, but unlike others, we do not 
assume the relationship between oil and democracy is common across countries, and we control 
for omitted common correlated effects. Our sample also differs. It is comprised only of those 61 
countries that produce oil but did not start to develop their oil industries after fully developed 
democratic institutions were already in place such as Norway, the US, and UK. 
 Our analysis concludes with a comment on the recent work of Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
(henceforth “HM”) and the reply to HM by Andersen and Ross (2014) (henceforth “AR”). These 
papers highlight the current democratic resource curse debate. To maximize comparability, we 
use similar data and techniques. Using the Polity score as an indicator for democratic institutions, 
HM provide evidence that suggests that oil abundance does not have a long-term effect on 
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democratic development. In contrast, AR reevaluate the relationship using the same data and 
mostly similar methodology, but find a negative relationship between oil and democracy during 
the post-1980 period. However we find that the AR finding for that post-1980 period is not 
robust, suggesting a conclusion more like that of HM, where there is no evidence of a democratic 
resource curse.  
II. Background  
The oil as blessing or curse literature has generated many variants, which have been of great 
interest to both economists and political scientists. For economists the most debated one 
concerns the effect of oil endowments on long-term growth. Do they raise long-term growth 
grates or lower them? This question prompted a great deal of empirical research. In the year 
2000 Doppelhofer et al. (2000) assessed the empirical evidence available at that time and 
declared that the repeated findings of a negative relation confirmed the oil curse effect on growth 
to be one of the most robust empirical relationships in the entire empirical growth literature. 
Recent research, however, has suggested that the link between natural resources and growth is 
less clear-cut, and may depend on whether or not various adverse links through the quality of 
institutions (especially democracy) are realized.  
Much of the attention on the resource curse, therefore, has shifted to analyzing the effect of oil 
endowments on democracy. Following some earlier work by Barro (1998) showing that 
countries with substantial oil (measured by an oil dummy) had a negative effect on democracy, 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Haber and Menaldo (2011) and Menaldo (2013) provided a rationale 
in terms of state capabilities, which includes the ability to collect taxes. For citizens to be willing 
to pay taxes, they are likely to insist that the state agrees to let them have a say in what the state 
does, i.e. by adopting democratic institutions. If the state has an alternative means of sustaining 
itself, such as by selling off its oil or other natural resources, it can avoid the costly process of 
developing the capability to tax its citizens and giving those citizens more say over what the 
government does. Only when the oil-endowed country adopts institutions like the effective rule 
of law and democracy can such countries use oil to their advantage. The political version of the 
oil curse (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Przeworski et al, 2000; Ross 2001, and 
2012), however, argues that this is quite unlikely. Oil rents lead to rent-seeking behavior, rent 
grabbing and rivalries that retard the development of democracy.   
4 
The number of studies on this political version of the resource curse has grown significantly. 
Ahmadov (2014) has conducted a meta–regression analysis on the basis of data taken from 29 
existing publicly available studies on the relation between oil rents and democracy. After 
controlling for the many different methodological differences, time periods and country 
coverage, Ahmadov (2014) finds the overall effect of oil rents on democracy to be small, 
negative, and significant, but with considerable heterogeneity across regions, being somewhat 
more negative among countries of the Middle East and North Africa but positive and highly 
significant in Latin America. 
III. Data  
A. Variables, Data, and Sample Coverage 
Oil abundance is measured as oil rents per capita (World Bank, 2011). Oil rents are defined as 
the difference between the unit price and production cost multiplied by production. Rents are 
used because their determinants are more exogenously determined than production or exports. 
While production and exports of oil may be affected by institutional conditions, reserve quality, 
an important determinant of rents, is determined by luck, the quality, depth, pool size and other 
geological conditions. For purposes of estimation, the natural logs of real oil rents per capita are 
used (henceforth “Oil Rents”). 
We use three different measures of democratic institutions, Polity, Civil Liberties, and Political 
Rights. Polity is perhaps the most commonly used indicator of democracy because it is “an index 
of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive” (HM, 4). While much of the literature 
has focused on Polity, BenYishay and Betancourt (2014) have emphasized that its aggregate 
character might conceal different trends that might characterize different components of 
democracy, such as Civil Liberties and Political Rights. They argue that Civil Liberties are more 
persistent than Political Rights and tend to encourage the development of Political Rights to a 
greater extent than Political Rights to Civil Liberties. For this reason, Civil Liberties would seem 
to be more important in the promotion of democracy in the long run. Political Rights relate to 
free and fair elections, while Civil Liberties refer to protection of individual rights such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and equal treatment under the law (Freedom House, 
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2013).  
By looking at the long-run effect of Oil Rents not only on Polity but also on Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights, our analysis extends the work of HM and AR on the oil-democracy link. We 
also extend the analysis of Omgba (2015), which studies the oil-democracy relationship in the 
context of colonization experiences (discussed in next section), by examining a larger sample of 
oil exporting countries (61 compared to 35) over a longer period of time (at least 30 years 
compared to a maximum of 10).   
The period of analysis was based on data availability for the key variables, Oil Rents1 and the 
measures of political institutions. The Civil Liberties and Political Rights measures become 
available beginning in 1974. A sample of 61 countries is constructed based on the availability of 
suitable data from 1974 to 2008. The analysis, discussed in the Methods section, allows for 
significant heterogeneity across countries, which requires a sufficient number of time periods to 
estimate country-specific coefficients (Mohaddes et al. 2013, 26). To this end, countries with less 
than 30 years of coverage or that lacked measurable change in either Oil Rents or political 
institutions were dropped. A further nine countries had to be dropped for the Polity analysis 
(bringing the sample to 52 countries), because the Polity score did not change over the sample 
period in these countries.2 These restrictions should be remembered before generalizing the 
results, because relaxing them would attenuate the sample average effects of Oil Rents. Among 
the excluded countries, there are producers such as the United States and Norway that 
mechanically show no oil-democracy relationship because they were fully democratized at the 
beginning of the sample period. 
B. Subsample Definitions 
Once the sample was determined for our base analysis, two further classifications were used. 
First, we break the sample into countries that have mature oil industries and countries with less 
experience. We also break the sample into three regional classifications, Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), Latin America and Caribbean, and the rest of the world (ROW). The rationale 
for using these categories is discussed below.  
 
1 Oil Rents data were prepared by the World Bank Wealth of Nations (World Bank, 2011), and are unavailable 
after 2008.  
2 Dropped countries include China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates.  
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Industry Tenure Motivation.—The timing of oil discovery is likely to affect how oil rents affect 
institutions. Countries that discovered oil before 1956 were considered mature. The year of oil 
discovery is available from The World History of Oil and Gas (Geo-Help Inc, 2011). According 
to Tsui (2010), to examine the long-term effects of oil on democratic institutions, it is necessary 
to account for the heterogeneity in both the initial level of democracy, and the magnitude and the 
timing of the major oil discoveries. While there was a general trend toward democracy in the 
world as a whole, among countries which were non-democratic some forty years before, he 
found that those which had experienced major oil discoveries early in that period were about 10 
percentage points below the trend of those that did not discover oil. By contrast, among countries 
that were at least somewhat democratic early on, he found no difference in trends further up the 
democracy scale.   
Two recent analyses that consider the maturity of the oil industry are Blanco et al. (2015) and 
Omgba (2015). Blanco et al. (2015) found that the number of years since peak oil discovery had 
a positive effect on government stability and a negative effect on bureaucratic quality, but oil had 
no causal effect on democracy itself. Omgba (2015) finds the direct effect of oil on democracy 
(measured by Polity 2) to be at most of marginal significance, at least after controlling for other 
factors such as health (captured by European settlers in 1900, latitude and a malaria index). The 
main finding from Omgba (2015), however, is that both Polity and the Voice and Accountability 
index (the most democracy-oriented measure from the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators) are positively related to the period of time between the beginning of oil production 
and a country’s political independence. 
Geographic Differences.—Treating the Middle East and North African and Latin American 
groups separately is important because they are both oil abundant regions but differ significantly 
in the level of political institutions in 1974 and in the degree to which their economies depend on 
oil. There are also important differences between them in their historical experience, culture, and 
socio-economic conditions. Not surprisingly, and as noted above, much of the existing literature 
has shown that the relationship between democracy and oil varies substantially across different 
parts of the world. In particular, the Middle East and North Africa has long been identified as a 
region with both substantial amounts of oil and little democracy. When oil was discovered in the 
Middle East and North Africa between 1930 and 1965, these countries were extremely low on 
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educational attainment, state capacity, and urbanization, which helps explain their low initial 
levels of democracy. While democracy has been on the rise throughout much of the world since 
then, its level has remained low in MENA (Huntington, 1991; Prezworski et al., 2000).  
The low levels of democracy in MENA were partially attributed to oil. Barro (1998) used 
pooled international cross-sections to show that urbanization, education, life expectancy and 
lagged democracy all had positive effects on subsequent democracy and that an oil dummy 
variable had a significant negative effect. More recent studies have continued to highlight the 
failure of MENA countries to democratize over time Ross (2012, 75) and Hertog (2007). Herb 
(2005) too showed that MENA countries had the lowest democracy scores in the world but 
attributed much of this to the influence of regional neighbors, because it also applied to MENA 
countries without oil.  
Other scholars, however, have pointed to another distinctive pattern in Latin America. For 
example Dunning (2008) pointed to the fact that in Latin America oil seemed to be positively 
related to the adoption of democracy. Even Ross (Ross, 2012, pp. 74, 85-86), conceded to Latin 
American exceptionalism with respect to the oil curse. Dunning provided a rationale saying that 
the emergence of oil rents would make wealthy elites less fearful that democracy would result in 
higher taxation and confiscation of their private wealth.  
Recent work (such as of Dunning, 2008; Ross, 2010; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Sinnott et al., 
2010) conclude that oil rents have not led to lower democracy in Latin America because of its 
high level of inequality.3 The rationale for arguing that Latin America is an anomaly is that in 
this region the state has been good at controlling and redistributing resource rents, which 
contributed to mass political support, and also because Latin America has been less dependent on 
natural resource rents than Middle Eastern and African countries (Sinnott et al., 2010).4  
Is Latin America an exception to the political resource curse as previous work has found? In 
our analysis the Latin America and Caribbean group includes Trinidad and Tobago Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Among this group of countries, the major oil producers are Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico, 
 
3 Sinnott et al (2010) provide a review of the impact of natural resources on institutions in the Latin American 
context. 
4 However, Sinnot et al. (2010) note that recent resource booms seem to have led to the weakening of democracy 
in Latin America, especially with respect to press freedom and rule of law, and call attention to the need for further 
research based on more recent data. 
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which have oil exports representing between 84 percent and 29 percent of total exports during 
the period 1975-2004 (Blanco and Grier, 2012).  
Our sample of MENA oil countries consists of the following 16 countries (Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen)5 and the remaining countries (Rest of the World) are from Sub Sahara 
Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries like Norway, US and 
UK have been excluded because they have been classified as fully democratic throughout the 
period. Certain others have had to be removed according to data availability limitations identified 
above.  
Appendix Table A1 includes summary statistics for the sample as a whole, and for each 
country group separately. The list of countries in each group is included in Appendix Table A.   
IV. Methods 
To estimate the effects of Oil Rents on institutional development we use two forms of an error-
correcting autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model and a distributed lag model. Before 
introducing the specific models, it is helpful to understand the assumed data generating process 
presented below. 
 !"#$!" = !!"!"#$!,!!!!j=1 + !!"!"#!,!!!qj=0 + !! + !!"  (1) 
 !"#$!" represents the institutional measure (Polity, Civil Liberties, or Political Rights) for 
country i at time t. Each institutional level is assumed to depend on a set of its past levels, on !"#!,! (Oil Rents), and its past levels. Country heterogeneity is allowed for by using country-
specific coefficients and fixed effects !!. For the present analysis Oil Rents are used as the sole 
explanatory variable because oil is theorized to have sweeping economic and social effects (as in 
Ross, 2012), and other controls might well have the effect of capturing some of the various 
possible channels through which Oil Rents affect institutions. As such, our empirical method 
aims to estimate the full effects of Oil Rents on institutions, but not the channels through which 
they operate.  
 
5
 Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are dropped from the Polity analysis because the Polity score 
did not change over the sample period in these countries.   
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For estimation, we reparameterized Equation (1) into an error correction form. In error 
correction form, the long-run relationship between oil and institutions can be consistently 
estimated separately from short-term fluctuations. The error correction form is appropriate 
because annual fluctuations in Oil Rents are unlikely to have lasting impacts on institutions while 
sustained increases over a few years may have such effects. Estimates from Equation (1) could 
be confounded by noise from annual fluctuations, while Equation (1) in differences would limit 
the interpretation of the results to the short-term changes. 
An error correction form of an ARDL model is presented below as Equation 2.  
 !!"#$!" = !! !"#$!,!!! −  !!!"#!" + !!"∗ !!"#$!,!!!!!!j=1   + !!"∗ !"#$!,!!!q-1j=0 + !! + !!"      (2) 
 
Where: !! =  − (1−  !!"!j=1 ); !! =  !!"qj=0 /(1− !!"! );  
  !!"∗ = − !!"!m=j+1 ; and !!"∗ = − !!"!m=j+1 .  
The short-run relations are captured by !!"∗ , while the long-term relationship is captured by !!. 
With a large change in !"#!", the response in the dependent variable might overshoot the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. When this happens, the error correction term, !! , serves to bring the 
relationship back to the long-run (hence the term “error correction”). The lag orders p and q were 
selected using Akaike and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria.6  
For an error correction model to be appropriate, (1) the error correction term should be 
statistically significant and with a negative value greater than negative two7, and (2) there must 
be a long-run cointegrating relationship between the level variables. Both institutional 
development and Oil Rents are likely to be persistent and have trends of integration order one 
(I(1)), and the cointegrating relationship, !!, must exist for the term !"#$!,!!! −  !!!"#!"  to be 
stationary. Stationarity is necessary for the equation to balance when !! is statistically 
significant. 
ARDL models have several advantages. The long-run effects are consistent regardless of 
whether the level variables are stationary or trended, and they are consistent in the presence of 
 
6 The lag order was selected separately by country and variable, and then averaged within country group. Group 
averages were between one and two for each group and variable and then rounded up to two. The results are also not 
very sensitive to lag order.  
7 This condition is met in all estimations (see Appendix for estimates of the error correction term). 
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endogeneity (Mohaddes et al. 2013, 26). We use two different error correction ARDL models 
that differ in the amount of restrictions applied. The most restrictive model assumes the 
relationships are common across panels (basic dynamic model with panel fixed effects, called 
“DFE”). We focus on the most flexible model, the mean group (MG) model, which simply 
estimates the ARDL model separately for each panel (allowing for heterogeneous short-term and 
long-term effects) and then reports the mean coefficients across panels. This model loses 
efficiency compared to the DFE model but is more appropriate when the estimated relationships 
are heterogeneous across countries. 
There is another ARDL model that is a hybrid of the MG and DFE models, called the pooled 
mean group (PMG). It allows the short-run effects to differ across countries, but assumes the 
long-term effects are common. The PMG model should be more efficient than the MG, but less 
efficient than the DFE and possibly still subject to bias. Consequently we focus on the more 
consistent MG model, but present the most efficient (DFE) results as robustness, and also 
because DFE models are common in the literature (e.g. HM). 
Our specifications also correct for cross-sectional dependence using a common correlated 
effects approach, which simply adds cross-sectional means of the dependent and independent 
variables and their lagged values to the ARDL specification (as suggested by Chudik and 
Pesaran, 2013). Cross-sectional dependence arises when the error terms are correlated across 
observations. In the present analysis, cross-sectional dependence could be caused by an omitted 
common correlated effect, e.g. oil prices. Controls for oil prices, subtracting the cross-sectional 
mean of each variable, clustering errors, or simply using year fixed effects could partially 
account for common correlated effects, but these approaches have limitations (Westerlund, 
2007).  
Equation 3 below presents the same error correction model as in Equation 2, but adds the 
modification for cross-sectional dependence (CS-ECM). 
 !!"#$!" = !! !"#$!,!!! −  !!!"#!" + !!"∗ !!"#$!,!!!!!!j=1   
      + !!"∗ !"#$!,!!!q-1j=0 + !! + !!"!!!!!!!!  + !!"   (3) 
 
Where !! = (!"#$! , !"#!); !"#$! =  !!! !"#$!"!!!! ; !"#! =  !!! !"#!"!!!!   
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Using the common correlated effects approach, the effects of Oil Rents are estimated from the 
relationship between idiosyncratic deviations from mean Oil Rents levels and idiosyncratic 
institutional deviations from the mean. !! captures the average relationships, observed and 
unobserved.8 Average levels of factors that affect institutions are captured, such as regional 
institutional change, economic development, and urbanization. Factors affecting Oil Rents, such 
as oil prices are also captured. Lagged cross-sectional means capture any serial correlation in 
omitted factors. The lag order is set as the integer value of the cube root of the number of time 
periods, in our case three lags are used (Mohaddes et al. 2013).   
We also use a cross section augmented distributed lag (CS-DL) model. It differs from the CS-
ECM models, is considered complementary, and possibly superior when using highly persistent 
variables, such as Polity, Civil Liberties, or Political Rights. The specification is similar to the 
CS-ECM model, but the dependent variable is modeled in levels, and the specification does not 
include lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables (in levels or changes).  
  !"#$!" = !!!"#!" + !!"∗ !"#$!,!!!q-1j=0 + !!  
  + !!!!"#$! +  !!"!!"#!!!!!!! + !!!    (4) 
 
As in the CS-ECM model, the lag order on !"#!!! is set as the integer value of the cube root of 
the number of time periods (three). However, unlike the CS-ECM model, the lag order on the 
cross-sectional mean of !"#$! is set to zero (Mohaddes et al. 2013, 15). 
Each of the models, the two CS-ECM models and the CS-DL, are used in estimating the 
results. It shoulld be remembered that the CS-ECM models are each specified in error correction 
form and differ simply in whether or not the short-run and long-run relationships are assumed to 
be homogeneous across countries. Of the CS-ECM models, the mean group, cross-sectionally 
augmented, error correction model (MG CS-ECM) is the least restrictive, allowing for 
heterogeneous short- and long-run relationships. The DFE CS-ECM model is the most 
restrictive, assuming homogeneous short- and long-run relationships. The MG CS-DL model 
differs from the MG CS-ECM model because it uses the distributed lag specification (instead of 
an error correction), but is similar in that it allows for heterogeneous short- and long-run 
relationships.  
 
8   Bove et al. (2015, 8) identify another benefit of the common correlated effects approach. It has similarities to 
counterfactual analysis because the cross-sectional averages are similar to predicted counterfactuals. 
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V. Results  
A. Polity, Civil Liberties, Political Rights, and Oil Rents Over Time 
Figure 1 illustrates how the levels of institutions (in this case Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights) and of Oil Rents have moved over time in the full sample of 61 countries and in each of 
the various country groups identified above. The annual means have been smoothed to help 
reduce annual fluctuations and more closely represent long-run trends. In most of the country 
groups, Oil Rents declined from the mid to late 1970s until the early 1990s when rents began to 
increase again. Civil liberties and Political Rights, like democracy (studied by Ross, 2012, and 
most others investigating the political curse hypothesis), were generally increasing, but there are 
important exceptions. Most importantly, in the Middle East and North African countries, both 
Civil Liberties and Political Rights were declining until the mid-1990s before starting to recover 
after that.  
 
(Insert Figure 1 Here) 
B. Statistical Analysis 
Table 1 presents the long-run effects of Oil Rents on each of the three institutional variables. 
The absence of a relationship is demonstrated using the CS-ECM and CS-DL specifications 
discussed in the methods section. The column heads indicate the models used, and the full 
regression results for the CS-ECM models are available in the Appendix (Tables A2, A3, and 
A4). The results are consistently insignificant for the full sample and in each of the country 
groups. Even in the countries with less-experience with oil and the MENA region, the effects are 
insignificant. Hence, so far at least, we conclude that Oil Rents do not have statistically 
significant long-run effects on Polity, Civil Liberties, or Political Rights. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Here) 
 
The results are generally still statistically insignificant when assuming the short- and long-run 
relations are the same across countries. Table 2 presents the homogenous effects of oil on each 
institutional variable from the DFE model. In each country group except for the Mature and 
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Latin America group, the effects are insignificant. The result is somewhat surprising too because 
we would expect the mature countries would be better able to manage oil rents, and Latin 
America has also been shown to be an exception to the oil curse. Overall, however, the results 
suggest there is no long-run relationship between the Oil Rents and Polity, Civil Liberties or 
Political Rights during the period 1974 - 2008.  
 
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
 
Robustness.—Next we proceed to carry out a series of robustness tests for changes in 
specifications, based on the MG CS-ECM models9. The specification changes are as follows: (a) 
a change in the measure of oil abundance from the natural log of oil rents per capita to oil rents 
as a percent of GDP, (b) changing the sample from 1974 – 2008 to post 1980 as in most of the 
AR results, and (c) the addition of non-oil GDP per capita as a control to account for the 
“modernization” or “development” impact on political development.10 The results are presented 
in Table 3 for each institutional variable. Estimates obtained from the alternative specifications 
are shown one change at a time. The first column reports the results from the base models in 
Table 1. The results from change (a) are reported in the second column and changes (b) and (c) 
in the third and fourth columns, respectively. 
We expected the results to be similar across the different tests, but with some changes. Oil 
rents as a share of GDP could be argued as less of a measure of oil abundance and more of a 
measure of dependence, in which case, they might be expected to be more negatively associated 
with democratic institutions than Oil Rents (natural logs of oil rents per capita). AR argue that oil 
should be more negatively associated in the post-1980 period. Lastly, including non-oil GDP 
may affect the results because GDP per capita has a modernizing influence and could be one of 
the channels through which oil affects institutions. If oil reduces growth, and growth is positively 
related to institutional development, then controlling GDP would reduce any negative effects of 
 
9
 The MG CS-ECM models were used as the base model for robustness tests because the ECM models are more 
common in the literature than CS-DL models. 
10 We previously excluded GDP per capita as a control because oil production is directly included in GDP, and 
because oil may also affect non-oil GDP. To account for the first problem we estimated GDP per capita excluding 
the portion due to oil revenues and used the adjusted non-oil measure of GDP per capita as a control. If oil also 
affects non-oil GDP, we may expect the relation between oil and institutions to change, which is discussed further 
below. GDP data are from World Bank (2013). 
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oil on institutions. Specifically, our expectations are that the changes (a) and (b), in the second 
and third columns, would result in more negative relations, while change (c), in the fourth 
column, would result in a more positive relation. 
 
(Insert Table 3 Here) 
 
The long-run effect of Oil Rents on democracy is statistically insignificant in the full sample 
and in each of the country groups, with a couple exceptions. When the control for non-oil GDP is 
added, there are significant (at ten percent) negative long-term effects of Oil Rents on Civil 
Liberties in Latin America and positive effects in the ROW. There are also negative long-term 
effects of Oil Rents on Polity that are significant at the five percent level in the full sample. This 
result is unexpected. Controlling for non-oil GDP was expected to reduce any negative long-term 
effects of oil, not to increase them as is the case here. The specifications using oil rents as a 
percent of GDP or the post-1980 period also did not systematically increase the negative effects. 
For example, there’s a positive (at ten percent) long-term effect of Oil Rents on Polity in the 
MENA region during the post-1980 period, but the effect is smaller or negative in the other 
specifications. Note that the estimated long-run effects of oil rents as percent of GDP are often 
large negative numbers. That may reflect the presence of an outlier country biasing the average 
effect for a country group. 
Cointegration.—For the error correction models to be appropriate, there must exist a 
cointegrating relationship between Oil Rents and Polity, Civil Liberties, or Political Rights 
because the variables are not stationary in levels. If two series are unrelated, but non-stationary, 
it is likely that a regression of one on the other will yield a statistically significant and spurious 
result. However, if a linear combination of the two unit root processes is stationary, then the 
variables are said to be cointegrated and the relationship is not spurious (Engle and Granger, 
1987). 
Appendix Table A5 presents the test results for integration order and stationarity. In most 
instances, the results suggest each variable exhibits a unit root process. The first section of each 
panel shows the results from unit root tests of the variables in levels. They are performed using 
Dickey Fuller, Fisher type panel tests (Choi, 2001), where the null hypothesis is that all panels 
contain a unit root. The second section of each panel shows the test results performed on the 
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variables in first differences. Generally, we fail to reject unit root in levels, but reject unit root in 
first differences. However, there are some exceptions. For example, in the Latin America and 
Caribbean group, the tests show Oil Rents may exhibit a unit root process, yet the institutional 
variables are likely stationary in levels. When each of these has a different integration order, it 
casts doubt on whether they could be cointegrated. 
Given the presence of unit roots, the cointegration tests become necessary. Appendix Table A6 
presents the results of Westerlund panel cointegration tests. Bootstrapped critical values were 
used to allow for cross-sectional dependence (Westerlund, 2007). In most instances we fail to 
reject no cointegration, so there is little to no evidence of cointegration. This implies that any 
significant long-run relations from the error correction models are spurious, because (consistent 
with HM) there exists no long-run relationship between Oil Rents and Polity, Political Rights, or 
Civil Liberties.  
VI. Comment on Recent Analysis 
Illustrated by the quotes shown below, from Andersen and Ross (2014) (AR) and Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) (HM), these two references are essential for understanding the current debate 
over the existence of a political resource curse: 
“The Haber–Menaldo article has had a powerful impact on the resource curse debate, calling 
into question widely held beliefs about the politically malignant effects of petroleum wealth” 
(AR, p. 994). Using the Haber and Menaldo data and models, AR showed from 1800 to the 
1970s there was no evidence of a resource curse (confirming the finding of HM) but that “since 
the late 1970s—the period that is the focus of most other studies—oil wealth has strongly 
inhibited democratization.” (AR, 994) 
Our primary analysis, presented above, and analysis of the valuable data prepared by HM lead 
us to agree largely with HM, there was no long-run relation between oil and Polity, even for the 
post-1980 period. Specifically, we replicate the most convincing analysis performed by AR, 
Table 2, p.1006, which itself first replicated the analysis of HM. AR then expand HM’s analysis 
by adding an interaction term between their oil measure and a post-1980 dummy variable.  
The convincing rationale for the addition of the post-1980 dummy was the fact that by 1980, in 
most developing countries, the relationship between governments and oil companies had 
changed radically due to the nationalization movement during the 1970s that was prompted by 
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the preceding jump in oil prices (1971-1974). In the AR analysis (see Table 2, Column 2 in their 
paper) the effect of oil on the change in Polity was positive but small prior to 1980. Post 1980, 
however, the effect was statistically significant and negative, because the large negative 
interaction term for the post-1980 period more than offset the small positive main effect of oil. 
The argument seems intuitive, given that the early developers like the US have continued to rely 
on private oil companies and Norway was already democratic long before its oil boom. By 
contrast, in the Middle East and in many other developing countries, oil production was 
nationalized and most of the countries remained highly autocratic. 
For the AR theory to be persuasive, however, their empirical finding should be robust to 
changes in the empirical specification. Yet, as we show in Table 4 below, in fact it is not. In 
Column (1) we first replicate the AR analysis for estimating the long-run effect of oil on Polity 
with the HM data set for the full period 1800-2006, including the interaction term for the post-
1980 period. The results match AR’s finding of a negative long-run effect of oil during the post 
period (obtained as the sum of the main effect and interaction term divided by the negative of the 
coefficient on the lagged value of Polity). In Column (2), we present the results for the 
corresponding specification based on the post-1980 period alone, and after dropping the no 
longer necessary interaction term. In contrast to AR’s results, the main effect of oil, and hence 
the long-run effect, is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level. This result is 
inconsistent with AR’s theory, suggesting that the long-run effect of oil is not robust.11  
 
(Insert Table 4 Here) 
 
Two methodological issues also warrant notice. First, for there to be a long-run relationship 
between Polity and oil, the two variables must be cointegrated because, as shown by HM, they 
are integrated variables (HM, 14). While we agree with AR that, because of the structural break 
attributable to oil nationalization, we might not expect a long-term relationship, or cointegration, 
 
11 Additional results are consistent with the finding reported in Column (2) of our Table 1. The long-run effect of 
oil is not robustly negative and statistically significant even during the post-1980 period. For example, in AR’s 
Table 2, Column (4), AR replicates HM’s analysis using fiscal reliance as an alternative measure to total oil income. 
They again find the interaction term for the post-1980 period to be negative and significant, however, the total effect 
during the post-1980 period (the addition of the main effect and interaction term) is not statistically significant. We 
also replicated the AR analysis in Tables 4 and 5 using the post-1980 period alone, and similarly found the effect of 
total oil income on Polity was not negative and statistically significant. These results are available on request. 
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over the whole period (AR, 1003), this does not preclude the necessary cointegrating relationship 
for the post-1980 period alone.  
Second, another important point discussed by AR is that the theoretical relationship between 
oil and institutions is one between countries not within countries. This is to say, countries with 
more oil may be expected to develop democratic institutions at a different rate than those with 
less oil. The within country relationship, in contrast, estimates the relationship between oil and 
governance institutions as they change over time within a country. While the initial research on 
the subject focused on the between-country relationship (e.g. Barro 1995), an important problem 
was recognized with this research. Between-country analysis omits country fixed effects and 
suffers from omitted variable bias. As noted above, it is an unfortunate statistical fact that we 
cannot estimate between-country relationships and at the same time also include country fixed 
effects. 
VII. Conclusion  
We find no robust long-run effect of oil abundance on democratic institutions using three 
different indicators associated with democracy (Polity, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights), 
estimating our model using different methods and samples, including non-oil GDP in our model, 
restricting the sample to the post-1980 period, and considering oil rents both as a share of GDP 
and per capita. Our work continues the debate on the link between institutions and oil. Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) similarly find no long-run effects of oil on Polity, while Andersen and Ross 
(2014) reevaluate the relationship using the same HM data, and provide evidence for the 
existence of long-run effects for the post-1980 period. AR is of course not the only study that 
shows a negative relation. The results from the meta-study, Ahmadov (2014), finds the overall 
effect of oil rents on democracy to be small, negative, and significant, but with considerable 
heterogeneity across regions - somewhat more negative among countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa but positive and highly significant in Latin America. The present study, by not 
finding a robust, significant, long-term relationship (in Latin America, MENA, among mature 
producers, or less mature producers), contributes further to the debate. 
We also replicated the results from AR and show a simple change to their models challenges 
the robustness of their findings. We expanded the empirical work done by HM to include two 
different aspects of democracy, Civil Liberties and Political Rights, and also to use the most 
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updated time-series econometric methods. Like HM, the regressions separately estimated long-
run effects from short-run, but our models also allowed for country-relationship heterogeneity, 
corrected for correlation across countries, and used an alternative model that is better suited for 
persistent dependent variables like democracy. In general, the results from the different models 
were insignificant. Moreover, the cointegration tests failed to find evidence of a long-term 
relationship between Oil Rents and any of the democracy measures, and there are additional 
countries that would attenuate the results because they were fully democratized at the beginning 
of the sample and show no long-run effects of oil. 
It is important to note that although we are unable to identify robust long-run negative effects 
of Oil Rents on democracy within countries on average, it may still be the case that oil may have 
significant negative effects, in the short- or long-run, in individual countries. AR also points out 
that the oil curse theory is about between-country levels of oil. Unfortunately, we know of no 
statistical methods that capture not only between-country differences but also capture important 
omitted characteristics. Until such a method is developed, country case studies investigating both 
the dynamics of the oil industry and the development of political institutions may be the best 
method for resolving this debate. 
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Figure 1. Civil Liberties, Political Rights, and Oil Rents per capita 
Lowess Smoothed Trends (1974 – 2008) 
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Table 1: Long-Run Multiplier for Oil Rent's Impact on Democracy.	Two	Mean	Group	Models.	Various	Indicators	and	Country	Groups.														 											 	
t statistics in brackets; + p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001.  
Mean group allows heterogeneous short- and long-run relations by country.  
CS-ECM – cross-sectionally augmented error correction model (Equation 3 in the 
text). CS-DL – cross-sectionally augmented distributed lag models (Equation 4 in the 
text). Oil rents per capita are used in natural log form. Civil liberties and Political 
Rights are scaled from 1 to 7 with more 7 indicating greater civil liberties or political 
rights. Polity scaled from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). Group composition 
presented in Table A7. Polity sample reduced from 61, excluding the countries: 
China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The complete CS-ECM regression results are presented in 
Appendix Table A2. 
  
Civil Liberties Political Rights Polity
Country Group CS-ECM CS-DL CS-ECM CS-DL CS-ECM CS-DL
Full -0.140 0.045 0.150 -0.021 1.643 0.018
[-0.595] [0.406] [0.568] [-0.140] [1.391] [0.026]
Mature 0.500 0.147 0.279 -0.059 16.362 0.091
[1.361] [0.530] [0.184] [-0.130] [1.200] [0.085]
Non-Mature 0.108 -0.003 0.089 -0.004 0.841 0.207
[0.978] [-0.040] [0.465] [-0.025] [1.200] [0.241]
Latin America -0.914 -0.646 -0.155 -0.309 -1.372 -3.619
[-1.460] [-1.224] [-0.220] [-0.370] [-0.474] [-1.503]
Middle East and North Africa -0.019 0.045 -0.018 0.010 0.811 -0.238
[-0.114] [0.423] [-0.199] [0.092] [1.097] [-1.212]
Rest of World 0.202 0.205 0.162 0.238 0.928 0.451
[0.809] [1.555] [0.624] [0.980] [0.840] [0.416]
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Table 2: Long-Run Multiplier for Oil Rent's Impact on Democracy.	CS-ECM	Fixed-Effects	Models.	Various	Indicators	and	Country	Groups.																												 	
t statistics in brackets; + p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001.  
Fixed effects models allow for heterogeneous intercepts by country, but restrict slopes 
to be common across countries. CS-ECM – cross-sectionally augmented error 
correction model. Oil rents per capita are used in natural log form. Civil liberties and 
Political Rights are scaled from 1 to 7 with more 7 indicating greater civil liberties or 
political rights. Polity scaled from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). Group 
composition presented in Table A7. Polity sample reduced from 61, excluding the 
countries: China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates. The specification is based on Equation 3 in the text, 
but simplified to restrict the short- and long-run relations to be the same across 
countries. 
 
 
Country Group CL PR Polity
Full -0.041 -0.066 -0.092
[-0.898] [-1.193] [-0.520]
Mature -0.375* -0.560* -1.628*
[-2.192] [-2.362] [-2.030]
Non-Mature -0.044 -0.066 -0.107
[-0.822] [-1.167] [-0.620]
Latin America -0.304 -0.595* -0.029
[-1.384] [-2.072] [-0.026]
Middle East and North Africa -0.003 0.008 0.103
[-0.076] [0.210] [0.808]
Rest of World -0.087 -0.117 -0.300
[-1.327] [-1.497] [-1.167]
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Table 3: Long-Run Multiplier for Oil Rent's Impact on Democracy.  
CS-ECM Mean Group with adjustments. Various	Indicators	and	Country	Groups. 			
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
t statistics in brackets; + p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001.  
See notes from Table 1. Base model from Table 1 (MG CS-ECM). 
Italy and Spain were dropped from post-1980 analysis due to lack of change in the 
dependent variable. Angola, Iraq, Italy, Spain, and Yemen were also dropped from 
the Polity post 1980 analysis for the same reason. The GDP control specification used 
only one lag of the cross-sectional means because three reduced the degrees of 
freedom too much for the model to run for every country. 
 
Panel A: Civil Liberties
Country Group Base Oil Rent % of GDP Post 1980 GDP Control
Full -0.140 -3.363 -0.333 -0.399
[-0.595] [-0.145] [-0.905] [-0.712]
Mature 0.500 -2.173 0.357 2.612
[1.361] [-0.794] [0.753] [1.134]
Non-Mature 0.108 81.576 0.065 0.058
[0.978] [1.169] [0.675] [0.651]
Latin America -0.914 0.010 0.065 -0.930+
[-1.460] [0.034] [0.151] [-1.679]
Middle East and North Africa -0.019 -9.464 0.975 -0.349
[-0.114] [-0.993] [1.292] [-1.254]
Rest of World 0.202 -51.773 -0.898 0.597+
[0.809] [-1.519] [-0.861] [1.653]
Panel B: Political Rights
Country Group Base Oil Rent % of GDP Post 1980 GDP Control
Full 0.150 -7.961 0.526 -0.076
[0.568] [-0.310] [0.832] [-0.073]
Mature 0.279 2.249 -0.407 -3.119
[0.184] [1.097] [-0.344] [-0.809]
Non-Mature 0.089 -38.380 -0.018 0.648
[0.465] [-0.446] [-0.070] [0.558]
Latin America -0.155 -0.184 0.147 -0.187
[-0.220] [-0.840] [0.140] [-0.313]
Middle East and North Africa -0.018 -4.139 -0.004 -0.993
[-0.199] [-1.090] [-0.041] [-1.466]
Rest of World 0.162 -30.812 0.149 0.696
[0.624] [-0.589] [0.367] [1.463]
Panel C: Polity
Country Group Base Oil Rent % of GDP Post 1980 GDP Control
Full 1.643 -242.782 1.696 -2.745*
[1.391] [-1.151] [1.242] [-2.123]
Mature 16.362 26.187 4.641 3.464
[1.200] [0.978] [1.077] [1.121]
Non-Mature 0.841 -355.292 0.651 -4.547
[1.200] [-1.295] [0.766] [-1.627]
Latin America -1.372 0.293 -4.190 -2.236
[-0.474] [0.585] [-1.290] [-0.512]
Middle East and North Africa 0.811 -7.054 1.273+ -0.652
[1.097] [-0.397] [1.701] [-0.663]
Rest of World 0.928 -258.391 3.656 12.986
[0.840] [-1.230] [1.164] [1.183]
26	
Table 4: Replication of Andersen and Ross (2014) Table 2, Column 1,  
and Sample Adjustment Long Run Effects on Polity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Same model as used in Andersen-Ross (2014). Dependent variable: Δ Polity. 
Driscoll Kray standard errors are used to allow for cross-sectional 
dependence. Data from Haber and Menaldo.  
t statistics in brackets; * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001. 	
(1) (2)
Long Run Effect (Post)
Lag Polity
Lag Total Oil Income
Lag Total Oil Inc. X Post
Δ Total Oil Income
Δ Total Oil Inc. X Post
Lag log(GPD pc)
Lag Civil War
Lag Reg. Democracy
Lag World Democracy
Δ log(GPD pc)
Δ Reg. Democracy
Δ World Democracy
DKSE DKSE Post80
-1.140* 0.752*
[-2.033] [2.642]
-0.087*** -0.157***
[-11.613] [-5.488]
0.045* 0.118*
[2.035] [2.507]
-0.144***
[-3.748]
-0.023 -0.163
[-1.008] [-1.517]
-0.340***
[-3.457]
-0.276 -2.313***
[-0.870] [-4.538]
0.063 -0.252
[0.140] [-0.363]
0.025*** 0.045*
[3.411] [2.610]
0.059* 0.657***
[2.048] [6.910]
1.322 2.013
[0.762] [0.863]
0.375*** 0.464***
[5.368] [4.538]
-0.278* 1.482***
[-2.568] [6.300]
Constant 2.552 0.000
[1.358] [.]
Total Observations 10195 3891
Number of Countries 163 163
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Table	A1.	Summary	Statistics	
						
  
Politya CL PR Oil Rents pc GDP pc
Group Countries 1975 2005 1975 2005 1975 2005 1975 2005 1975 2005
Full Sample 61 -4.04 3.98 3.15 4.25 2.86 4.18 1,690 985 5,313 5,847
Mature 34 -3.31 4.42 3.32 4.21 3.21 4.09 3,000 1,689 8,010 7,728
Less-Experience 27 -4.82 3.52 2.93 4.30 2.43 4.30 40 99 1,918 3,478
Latin America 12 -0.73 7.91 4.08 5.00 3.58 5.00 373 407 3,097 4,263
MENA 18 -5.86 -1.69 2.83 2.89 2.42 2.56 5,243 2,772 11,060 8,970
ROW 31 -4.44 5.11 2.97 4.74 2.84 4.81 136 172 2,834 4,647
a. Reduced country sample excludes: China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Libya, Papua New 
Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.   
Oil was discovered before 1956 in Mature countries. 
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Table	A2.	Oil	Rent's	Impact	on	Civil	Liberties	by	Country	Group		CS-ECM	Mean	Group	Regressions																																	 		 	
t statistics in brackets;  * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Mean group allows heterogeneous short- and long-run relations by country.  
CS-ECM – cross-sectionally augmented error correction model (Equation 3 in the 
text). Oil rents per capita are used in natural log form. Civil liberties are scaled from 1 
to 7 with more 7 indicating greater civil liberties. Group composition presented in 
Table A7. 
 
(1)
Full Sample
(2)
Mature
(3)
Low-Exp.
(4)
Latin America
(5)
MENA
(6)
ROW
ln(Oil Rents pc) -0.140
[-0.595]
0.500
[1.361]
0.108
[0.978]
-0.914
[-1.460]
-0.019
[-0.114]
0.202
[0.809]
Short Run
Error Correction Term
Lag ΔCL
Δ ln(Oil Rents pc)
Lag Δln(Oil Rents pc)
CL Mean
Lag CL Mean
Lag2 CL Mean
Lag3 CL Mean
lnRents Mean
Lag lnRents Mean
Lag2 lnRents Mean
Lag3 lnRents Mean
-0.568***
[-12.929]
0.124***
[3.679]
-0.038
[-0.453]
-0.046
[-0.650]
0.852***
[4.597]
-0.402*
[-2.332]
-0.040
[-0.283]
0.009
[0.063]
0.105
[1.169]
-0.017
[-0.171]
-0.052
[-0.529]
-0.037
[-0.620]
-0.481***
[-7.886]
0.035
[0.921]
-0.219
[-0.943]
0.029
[0.140]
0.969***
[4.880]
-0.558**
[-3.048]
-0.066
[-0.373]
-0.017
[-0.112]
0.205
[0.871]
-0.257
[-0.672]
0.007
[0.033]
0.037
[0.462]
-0.714***
[-12.345]
0.193***
[3.943]
-0.068
[-0.856]
-0.031
[-0.675]
1.119***
[5.948]
-0.408**
[-2.684]
0.187
[0.964]
0.068
[0.390]
0.002
[0.029]
-0.095
[-1.391]
-0.019
[-0.190]
0.014
[0.158]
-0.587***
[-5.162]
0.122*
[2.397]
0.332
[1.016]
0.243
[0.671]
0.823*
[2.023]
-0.500+
[-1.855]
0.183
[1.074]
0.026
[0.130]
0.314
[1.136]
0.098
[0.279]
0.229
[0.646]
0.013
[0.106]
-0.571***
[-9.926]
0.145**
[2.909]
0.075
[0.892]
-0.027
[-0.442]
0.952***
[3.863]
-0.480
[-1.640]
0.169
[0.650]
-0.105
[-0.486]
-0.036
[-0.287]
0.087
[0.508]
0.010
[0.069]
0.055
[0.609]
-0.583***
[-11.263]
0.085*
[1.968]
-0.105
[-0.847]
-0.103
[-1.219]
1.077***
[10.705]
-0.447**
[-3.200]
0.043
[0.334]
0.080
[0.617]
0.023
[0.328]
-0.014
[-0.113]
-0.115
[-1.113]
0.020
[0.292]
Constant
Total Observations
0.184
[0.254]
1951
-0.436
[-0.941]
1088
-0.979
[-0.783]
863
0.078
[0.066]
384
-0.853+
[-1.674]
576
-1.017
[-1.316]
991
Number of Countries 61.000 34.000 27.000 12.000 18.000 31.000
Periods - Avg. 31.984 32.000 31.963 32.000 32.000 31.968
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Table	A3.	Oil	Rent's	Impact	on	Political	Rights	by	Country	Group	CS-ECM	Mean	Group	Regressions																																 											 	
t statistics in brackets;  * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Mean group allows heterogeneous short- and long-run relations by country.  
CS-ECM – cross-sectionally augmented error correction model (Equation 3 in the 
text). Oil rents per capita are used in natural log form. Political Rights are scaled from 
1 to 7 with more 7 indicating greater political rights. Group composition presented in 
Table A7. 
 
(1)
Full Sample
(2)
Mature
(3)
Low-Exp.
(4)
Latin America
(5)
MENA
(6)
ROW
ln(Oil Rents pc) 0.150
[0.568]
0.279
[0.184]
0.089
[0.465]
-0.155
[-0.220]
-0.018
[-0.199]
0.162
[0.624]
Short Run
Error Correction Term
Lag ΔPR
Δ ln(Oil Rents pc)
Lag Δln(Oil Rents pc)
PR Mean
Lag PR Mean
Lag2 PR Mean
Lag3 PR Mean
lnRents Mean
Lag lnRents Mean
Lag2 lnRents Mean
Lag3 lnRents Mean
-0.475***
[-14.409]
0.140***
[5.396]
-0.099
[-1.067]
-0.012
[-0.150]
0.874***
[3.650]
-0.575*
[-2.190]
0.211
[0.905]
-0.110
[-0.573]
0.040
[0.304]
-0.152
[-0.880]
-0.012
[-0.082]
-0.027
[-0.362]
-0.471***
[-9.795]
0.133***
[3.339]
-0.127
[-0.510]
0.043
[0.176]
1.213***
[4.291]
-0.682*
[-2.563]
0.228
[0.807]
-0.006
[-0.023]
-0.026
[-0.088]
-0.194
[-0.555]
0.066
[0.237]
-0.058
[-0.648]
-0.608***
[-9.794]
0.144**
[3.274]
-0.025
[-0.337]
-0.041
[-0.741]
0.818**
[3.161]
-0.466
[-1.596]
0.369+
[1.925]
-0.221
[-1.147]
-0.032
[-0.428]
0.006
[0.061]
-0.046
[-0.495]
0.018
[0.184]
-0.455***
[-7.084]
0.143*
[2.449]
0.016
[0.047]
0.159
[0.446]
1.100***
[3.706]
-0.680**
[-2.594]
0.252
[1.272]
-0.017
[-0.082]
0.155
[0.367]
-0.104
[-0.191]
0.136
[0.335]
-0.016
[-0.138]
-0.629***
[-9.748]
0.202***
[5.225]
0.092
[1.010]
0.073
[1.023]
0.956**
[2.982]
-0.628*
[-2.340]
0.298
[1.374]
0.028
[0.186]
-0.086
[-0.795]
0.016
[0.095]
0.044
[0.263]
-0.058
[-0.492]
-0.611***
[-11.395]
0.163***
[3.676]
-0.126
[-1.208]
-0.043
[-0.467]
0.865***
[3.763]
-0.437
[-1.591]
0.194
[0.789]
-0.053
[-0.263]
-0.025
[-0.217]
-0.140
[-0.933]
0.001
[0.006]
-0.028
[-0.293]
Constant
Total Observations
0.483
[0.550]
1951
-1.133
[-1.010]
1088
-0.268
[-0.345]
863
-1.297
[-1.027]
384
0.211
[0.306]
576
-0.334
[-0.369]
991
Number of Countries 61.000 34.000 27.000 12.000 18.000 31.000
Periods - Avg. 31.984 32.000 31.963 32.000 32.000 31.968
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Table	A4.	Oil	Rent's	Impact	on	Polity	by	Country	Group		CS-ECM	Mean	Group	Regressions											
	
	
		
t statistics in brackets;  * p<0.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Oil rents per capita are used in natural log form. Polity scaled from -10 (autocracy) to 
10 (democracy). Group composition presented in Table A7. Sample reduced from 61 
to exclude the countries: China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, because the Polity score did not change 
over the sample period in these countries. 
(1)
Full Sample
(2)
Mature
(3)
Low-Exp.
(4)
Latin America
(5)
MENA
(6)
ROW
ln(Oil Rents pc) 1.643
[1.391]
16.362
[1.200]
0.841
[1.200]
-1.372
[-0.474]
0.811
[1.097]
0.928
[0.840]
Short Run
Error Correction Term
Lag Δ(Polity2)
Δ ln(Oil Rents pc)
Lag Δln(Oil Rents pc)
Polity Mean
Lag Polity Mean
Lag2 Polity Mean
Lag3 Polity Mean
lnRents Mean
Lag lnRents Mean
Lag2 lnRents Mean
Lag3 lnRents Mean
-0.495***
[-12.311]
0.185***
[4.632]
-0.078
[-0.170]
-0.209
[-0.734]
1.129***
[5.168]
-0.704*
[-2.148]
0.267
[0.889]
-0.041
[-0.223]
-0.826*
[-2.197]
0.132
[0.288]
-0.136
[-0.304]
0.036
[0.125]
-0.403***
[-8.644]
0.044
[0.867]
-0.503
[-0.584]
-0.694
[-0.836]
1.063***
[4.290]
-0.678**
[-2.981]
0.028
[0.137]
0.101
[0.622]
-1.105
[-1.520]
0.203
[0.236]
-0.751
[-0.861]
-0.095
[-0.252]
-0.506***
[-7.854]
0.272***
[4.819]
-0.366
[-1.212]
-0.081
[-0.561]
1.196***
[4.791]
-0.775*
[-2.278]
0.138
[0.341]
0.071
[0.334]
-0.195
[-0.478]
-0.443
[-1.038]
0.246
[0.585]
0.029
[0.087]
-0.500***
[-5.804]
0.071
[1.221]
2.391
[1.373]
0.335
[0.318]
1.176***
[3.586]
-0.438*
[-2.434]
-0.060
[-0.278]
-0.091
[-0.333]
-1.591
[-0.797]
1.846
[0.940]
0.396
[0.456]
0.097
[0.173]
-0.382***
[-6.667]
0.183***
[3.755]
0.152
[0.910]
-0.179
[-0.778]
0.993+
[1.676]
-0.942
[-1.423]
0.307*
[2.099]
0.272
[1.022]
-0.498
[-0.951]
0.102
[0.263]
-0.384
[-0.738]
-0.386
[-1.001]
-0.693***
[-8.655]
0.321***
[5.719]
-0.384
[-0.661]
-0.432
[-1.421]
1.025***
[5.253]
-0.538+
[-1.933]
0.278
[1.256]
0.089
[0.610]
-0.465+
[-1.675]
-0.051
[-0.106]
-0.233
[-0.579]
0.187
[0.503]
Constant
Total Observations
-0.069
[-0.051]
1657
0.295
[0.128]
858
-1.158
[-1.350]
799
0.199
[0.084]
352
2.985
[1.322]
442
-1.117
[-0.625]
863
Number of Countries 52.000 27.000 25.000 11.000 14.000 27.000
Periods - Avg. 31.865 31.778 31.960 32.000 31.571 31.963
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Table A5: Test for Integration Order of Polity,  
Civil Liberties, Political Rights, and Oil Rents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
 
 
 
  
Dickey Fuller, Fisher style panel unit root tests (Choi 2001). The null hypothesis is 
that all panels contain a unit root. 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
Oil Rents Chi-Squared P 0.004 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.001
Inverse Logit L 1.000 1.000 0.004 0.909 1.000 0.967
Inverse Normal Z 1.000 1.000 0.806 0.999 1.000 1.000
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.002 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.000
Unit Root Support Yes Yes Low Yes Yes Yes
Δ Oil Rents Chi-Squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
Inverse Logit L 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Inverse Normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Stationary in Diffs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
Polity Chi-Squared P 0.000 0.888 0.000 0.000 0.759 0.419
Inverse Logit L 0.045 0.812 0.001 0.000 0.876 0.699
Inverse Normal Z 0.620 0.815 0.322 0.013 0.881 0.829
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.000 0.880 0.000 0.000 0.770 0.444
Unit Root Support Low Yes Low No Yes Yes
Δ Polity Chi-Squared P 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000
Inverse Logit L 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000
Inverse Normal Z 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000
Stationary in Diffs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
CL Chi-Squared P 0.055 0.853 0.001 0.000 0.902 0.958
Inverse Logit L 0.263 0.869 0.014 0.000 0.922 0.762
Inverse Normal Z 0.613 0.859 0.219 0.010 0.920 0.780
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.049 0.850 0.000 0.000 0.890 0.946
Unit Root Support Yes Yes Low No Yes Yes
Δ CL Chi-Squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse Logit L 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse Normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stationary in Diffs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
PR Chi-Squared P 0.000 0.897 0.000 0.000 0.816 0.000
Inverse Logit L 0.000 0.875 0.000 0.000 0.859 0.001
Inverse Normal Z 0.195 0.894 0.003 0.027 0.856 0.206
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.000 0.890 0.000 0.000 0.817 0.000
Unit Root Support Low Yes No No Yes Low
Δ PR Chi-Squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Inverse Logit L 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse Normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified Inverse Chi-Sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stationary in Diffs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A6: Cointegration Results, Westerlund Panel Tests 	
		
 
 
 				 	 	
Polity Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
Group Mean Test t 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.80 0.48 0.46
Group Mean Test a 0.24 0.62 0.04 0.74 0.52 0.04
Panel Test t 0.66 0.28 0.88 0.84 0.32 0.58
Panel Test a 0.46 0.34 0.60 0.82 0.30 0.42
Cointegration Support No No No No No No
Civil Liberties Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
Group Mean Test t 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.34
Group Mean Test a 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.14 0.30 0.58
Panel Test t 0.16 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.66 0.46
Panel Test a 0.10 0.10 0.46 0.30 0.28 0.50
Cointegration Support No No No No No No
Political Rights Full Sample Mature Low-Exp. LAC MENA ROW
Group Mean Test t 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.10
Group Mean Test a 0.22 0.20 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.34
Panel Test t 0.22 0.18 0.86 0.24 0.22 0.52
Panel Test a 0.16 0.14 0.72 0.16 0.16 0.26
Cointegration Support No No No No No No
Group tests, rejecting H0 suggests that there is cointegration between oil rents per 
capita and the relevant institution for at least one country. 
Panel tests, rejecting HO suggests that the panel as a whole is cointegrated. 
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Table	A7.	List	of	Countries	and	Group	Composition		
						
Mature Countries LAC MENA ROW Less-Exp. Countries LAC MENA ROW
Albania X Bangladesh X
Algeria X Bulgaria X
Angola X Chile X
Bolivia X China X
Cuba X Congo, Rep. X
Egypt, Arab Rep. X Congo, Dem. Rep. X
Indonesia X Ecuador X
Iran, Islamic Rep. X Guatemala X
Iraq X Jordan X
Kuwait X Mongolia X
Libya X Philippines X
Mexico X Senegal X
Nigeria X Sudan X
Peru X Tunisia X
Poland X Cameroon X
Qatar X Cote d'Ivoire X
Romania X Korea, Rep. X
Syrian Arab Republic X Morocco X
United Arab Emirates X Spain X
Bahrain X Benin X
Brazil X Chad X
Gabon X Yemen X
Hungary X Greece X
Saudi Arabia X Pakistan X
Argentina X Israel X
Trinidad and Tobago X Papua New Guinea X
Turkey X South Africa X
Venezuela, RB X
Colombia X
India X
Italy X
Japan X
Malaysia X
Thailand X
Source: Author Calculations 
